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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 17-2026 
__________ 
 
RICHARD ALLEN RATUSHNY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT HUNTINGDON SCI; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA;  
DISTRICT ATTORNEY NORTHAMPTON COUNTY 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Civil No.  5-14-cv-01324) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 May 25, 2018 
 
BEFORE:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed June 26, 2018) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 Before proceeding to the merits of this habeas appeal, we first must determine the 
scope of the District Court’s certificate of appealability (COA).1  Petitioner Richard 
Ratushny argues for an expansive reading of the certificate to encompass all of the issues 
he now raises on appeal.  The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that the District 
Court limited its grant to a single issue: the Petitioner’s Brady claim.2  We may not 
consider issues on appeal that are not within the scope of the COA.3  However, we may, 
in our discretion, expand the scope of the certificate beyond that announced by the 
District Court.4   
 The District Court’s order denying habeas relief contains a general statement that 
“the Court issues a certificate of appealability.”  The Petitioner points to this sentence as 
evidence that the COA is expansive, encompassing all the claims he raised in the District 
                                              
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 
and 2253.  We will dispense with the usual recitation of the factual background and 
procedural history of this matter, as both are well-known to the parties and 
comprehensively set forth in the District Court’s memorandum and the U.S. Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation.  For this same reason, we will also dispense with 
citations to the record.  We need only relate that a Pennsylvania jury convicted the 
Petitioner of aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, endangering the welfare of 
children, corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with a minor, crimes which 
stemmed from his sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s daughters.  He was sentenced to six to 
nineteen years in prison. 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
3 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 22.1(b); Miller v. 
Dragovich, 311 F.3d 574, 577 (3d Cir. 2002). 
4 See 3d Cir. LAR 22.1(b). 
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Court.  But, the District Court’s memorandum opinion explains otherwise.  The Petitioner 
raised these habeas claims in the District Court: an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
arising from trial counsel’s alleged conflict of interest, an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim stemming from trial counsel’s failure to uncover a prior criminal 
conviction of his victim’s mother, and a Brady violation claim.  Ratushny’s petition was 
referred to a U.S. Magistrate Judge, who recommended that relief be denied on all claims. 
   We read the COA as limited solely to the Brady violation.  The structure of the 
District Court’s opinion adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is 
obvious, using Roman numerals and capital letters to demarcate its discussion and 
analysis.  Relevant here, the District Court’s opinion deals with the Petitioner’s claims in 
separate, delineated sections:  Part III, section “A.” dealt with the Petitioner’s 
ineffectiveness claims while Part III, section “B.” dealt with the purported Brady 
violations.  In Section A., the District Court specifically held that Ratushny was “not 
entitled to relief” on the ineffectiveness claims.5  Compare this with section B, wherein 
the District Court specifically noted that “although the Court will deny relief, a certificate 
of appealability will issue.”  Because the sections of the District Court’s opinion are 
clearly delineated with headings and subheadings, and because its grant of a COA is 
                                              
5 The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation rolled both ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims into one discussion and analysis.  The District Court did not identify 
the ineffectiveness claim focusing on the victim’s mother’s prior conviction for specific 
discussion, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation without analysis.  No COA 
was, therefore, given by the District Court on this claim, and despite the District Court’s 
lack of specific discussion of this issue, the Petitioner has not sought one on appeal.   
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found only in Part III, Section B., it is just as clearly limited to the Brady claim.  We, 
therefore, lack jurisdiction to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.6   
II. 
 We turn now to the claim on which the Petitioner was granted a COA, the alleged 
Brady violation.7  Brady teaches that a state bears an “affirmative duty to disclose 
[material] evidence favorable to a defendant.”8  “Material” evidence is that in which there 
is “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”9  The Supreme Court clarified that 
“[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be 
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 
                                              
6 While we have the authority to expand the scope of the certificate of appealability sua 
sponte, we decline to do so here because reasonable jurists could not debate the District 
Court's conclusion that state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 
unreasonable.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984);  28 U.S.C. 
§2254(d)(1).  The state court held a post-conviction relief hearing and determined that 
counsel had not violated the Commonwealth’s conflict of interest prescriptions.  Further, 
the state court concluded that Ratushny’s interests did not diverge from those of the 
subject of the conflict of interest, a witness.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed 
with a comprehensive discussion of this issue, holding that the situation was not likely to 
be a conflict of interest.  Given the wide deference afforded to the state court’s 
determinations, we agree with the District Court that Ratushny should not be accorded 
relief on this claim and that reasonable jurists would not disagree. 
7 The Petitioner raises the second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, but 
given our holding that the District Court’s COA is limited to the Brady violation, we lack 
jurisdiction to review this claim as well and decline to use our discretionary authority to 
review it.   
8 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. 83).   
9 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).   
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evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 
prejudice must have ensued.”10    
 The Petitioner asserts the Commonwealth violated Brady by failing to divulge the 
fact that the victim’s mother—his former girlfriend and a witness for the prosecution—
had a fraud conviction on her resume that could have been used for impeachment 
purposes.  The Pennsylvania PCRA court determined that while this evidence fell under 
Brady’s purview, there was no violation because there was no support on the record for a 
finding that the Commonwealth “possessed or controlled that information” and then 
either intentionally or inadvertently failed to disclose it to the defense.  The state court 
based its conclusion on the fact that public record of the conviction was available to the 
defense and because there was no evidence that the prosecution had a record of this 
conviction and withheld it from the defense.  We agree with the District Court that the 
criminal record was suppressed under Brady, as we have specifically explained.11  The 
state courts reliance on the fact that the criminal records were publicly accessible is of no 
moment since public availability does not absolve a prosecutor from the responsibility to 
provide such records to the defense.12  Nor is the prosecution relieved of its 
responsibilities under Brady where defense counsel fails to ask for such records.  A 
                                              
10 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
11 See Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 663 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. 
Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
12 Id. at 663-664. 
 6 
 
prosecutor’s duties are clear under Brady and an analysis of whether defense counsel 
could have or should have discovered the records is “beside the point.”13 
 But, the fact Brady material was suppressed does not necessarily mean the state 
court unreasonably applied federal law.  To reiterate, the failure to disclose Brady 
evidence only mandates a new trial if such evidence is “material,” that is, if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”14  Here, the state courts made the 
determination that the reliability and credibility of the victim’s mother were not “critical 
or essential” to the conviction.  Several other witnesses, including another sister of the 
victim, testified to the fact that she had misrepresented herself on numerous occasions.  
Furthermore, various friends had testified that the victim confided in them about the 
abuse.  Based on this, the state court determined that the Brady material was not 
favorable enough to overcome other evidence and affect the verdict, and, therefore, “did 
not undermine the fairness of the proceeding.”  This conclusion is consistent with our 
standard for determining whether Brady evidence was material.  Hence, we agree with 
the District Court that the state courts did not unreasonably apply federal law in 
concluding that the Brady evidence was not material, especially given the corroborating 
testimony of the victim and others.  The victim’s mother was thoroughly cross-examined, 
during which Petitioner’s counsel elicited from her information about her long history of 
drug use (including her use of illegal drugs with her minor daughter), her difficult 
                                              
13 Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dept. Corrections, 834 F.3d 263, 291 (3d Cir. 2016). 
14 Bagley, 473 U.S. at  682. 
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relationship with her daughter, and her belief that she was competing with her daughter 
for Petitioner’s attention and affections.  Cross-examination also revealed her two-year 
delay in reporting the sexual abuse, as well as her prior threats to report the Petitioner to 
the police, and her repeated threats to report him to the authorities in order to exact some 
revenge on him for leaving her.  Defense counsel’s closing argument specifically focused 
on the victim’s mother’s lack of credibility and veracity.   
 Given this, the fact that the victim’s mother had been convicted of a fraud offense 
was not significant.  We have stated that “[t]he materiality of Brady material depends 
almost entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the 
state.”15  The Brady evidence that she had been convicted of fraud does nothing to “put 
the whole case in a different light as to undermine [] confidence in the verdict.”16
 Therefore, this Brady evidence was not material, and, for the foregoing reasons, 
we will affirm.      
                                              
15 Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 
387, 396 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
16 Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1998). 
